Financial Development, Financial Liberalization and Social Capital by Elkhuizen, Luuk et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Financial Development, Financial Liberalization and Social Capital
Elkhuizen, Luuk; Hermes, Niels; Jacobs, Jan
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2016
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Elkhuizen, L., Hermes, N., & Jacobs, J. (2016). Financial Development, Financial Liberalization and Social
Capital. (SOM Research Reports; Vol. 16021-EEF). Groningen: University of Groningen, SOM research
school.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the























Financial Development, Financial 











SOM is the research institute of the Faculty of Economics & Business at 
the University of Groningen. SOM has six programmes:  
-  Economics, Econometrics and Finance 
-  Global Economics & Management 
-  Organizational Behaviour 
-  Innovation & Organization 
-  Marketing 
-  Operations Management & Operations Research 
Research Institute SOM 
Faculty of Economics & Business 








P.O. Box 800 
9700 AV   Groningen 
The Netherlands 
 
T +31 50 363 9090/3815 
 
www.rug.nl/feb/research 





























































Financial Development, Financial Liberalization 







University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business 
 
Niels Hermes 
University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics 
Econometrics and Finance 




University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics 

















Financial Development, Financial Liberalization and Social Capital  
 
Luuk Elkhuizen 
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, The Netherlands 
 
Niels Hermes* 
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, The Netherlands 
Solvay Business School, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium 
 
Jan Jacobs 






The relationship between financial liberalization policies and financial development is 
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While research on the relationship between financial development and economic growth is still 
expanding, there appears to be consensus that financial development has a positive influence on 
economic growth (Beck et al., 2000). This consensus renders the factors that influence financial 
development important. Especially policy makers of countries with less developed financial 
sectors may benefit from a better understanding of the forces that shape their financial sector. 
Consequently, there has been a spike in research on the determinants of financial development in 
recent years. This research has focused on long-run (e.g. culture, geography, etc.) as well as 
short-run (e.g. macroeconomic policies) determinants of financial development.  
Financial liberalization is one of the short-run determinants that has been put forward as a 
potentially important prerequisite for successful financial development. This view rests on the 
belief that liberalizing financial markets allows interest rates to reach their competitive market 
equilibrium, which will boost savings, investments and ultimately economic growth (McKinnon, 
1973; Shaw, 1973). Based on this view, since the 1970s policy makers have been liberalizing 
their financial sectors. This accelerated during the 1990s, after Williamson (1990) introduced 
what he called the ‘Washington consensus’.  
 This view has been contested, however, both in academic research as well as by 
practical experience. For example, in the early 1980s Latin American countries such as Chile and 
Argentina experienced huge macroeconomic crises after a period of strong financial liberalization 
(Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). Also, the Asian crisis  of 1997-1998 was, at least partly, due to 
liberalization programs of financial markets these countries had been carried out since the late 
1980s (Mishkin, 1999). These and other experiences suggest that we still do not exactly know 
under what conditions financial liberalization policies really work, i.e. the context in which these 
policies are carried out may have an impact on the outcomes of these policies. Recently, 
therefore, research has started exploring the underlying sources of the observed heterogeneity 
with respect to the effects of financial liberalization on financial development and economic 
growth. Factors that have been identified as prerequisites of successful financial liberalization are 
bureaucratic efficiency, a strong rule of law, proper contract enforcement, control over corruption 
and prudential regulation and supervision (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998; Summers 
2000; Hermes and Meesters 2015; Jiang et al., 2015).  
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 In this paper, we contribute to this literature by investigating the importance of social 
capital as a prerequisite for effective financial liberalization policies. In particular, we argue that 
social capital may substitute for failing formal institutions. That is, financial liberalization 
policies may be effective in stimulating financial development, even if strong formal institutions 
are absent, as long as social capital development is strong. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature 
describing the impact of financial liberalization on financial development. In this section, we also 
discuss social capital and how this may act as a prerequisite for effective financial liberalization 
policies. Section 3 describes our empirical methodology and provides a description of the data 
base we have. The results of the empirical analysis are discussed in section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Financial development, financial liberalization and social capital: A literature review 
2.1 Financial development and the pros and cons of financial liberalization 
Financial development occurs when financial markets or institutions reduce market 
imperfections, thereby allowing capital to flow to its most productive use (Čihák et al., 2012). In 
the 1950s and 1960s, conventional wisdom stipulated that governments could promote 
development by protecting and intervening in financial markets,  using policies such as interest 
rate ceilings and credit controls, and establishing state-owned banks. Government interventions 
like these are commonly referred to in the literature as financial repression (Andersen and Tarp, 
2003). These policies became subject to severe criticism in the early 1970s by McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973), who argued that liberalizing financial sectors would spur growth. According to 
them, keeping interest rates low negatively affects savings, which hampers the development of 
the banking system. Likewise, it creates excess demand for credit, which harms efficient 
allocation of capital as banks have no incentive to direct credit towards the most profitable 
projects. 
 From the 1970s countries throughout the world acted upon this device and gradually 
started liberalizing their financial sectors by reducing interest and credit controls, reducing entry 
barriers for domestic and foreign banks, and liberalizing the capital account. Increased bank 
competition was expected to stimulate financial development as banks would offer higher interest 
rates to attract more savings, enabling them to provide more investment. Moreover, competition 
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would provide incentives to reduce overhead costs and improve on bank and risk management 
(Denizer et al., 2007), while the entry of foreign banks would stimulate the spillover of new 
bank- and risk-management techniques and the development of new financial instruments and 
services (Claessens et al., 2001). Capital account liberalization was expected to increase 
possibilities for portfolio diversification for domestic as well as foreign investor, which would 
also encourage domestic financial market development (Chinn and Ito, 2006). Among developing 
countries, financial liberalization occurred especially in the post Washington-consensus period 
(i.e. after 1990), arguably because these countries feared their economies would miss out on the 
benefits of an increasingly global world economy (Gore, 2000).  
The expected positive effects of financial liberalization have been disputed. Stiglitz 
(2000) argues that the argument that liberalizing repressed financial sectors leads to more 
efficient credit allocation is flawed. While under perfect information this may be true, financial 
markets are characterized by asymmetric information. Stiglitz shows that under asymmetric 
information, decentralization through the price mechanism (i.e. allowing banks to set their 
interest rates freely) will not necessarily lead to a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.  
Boot (2000) argues that financial liberalization may actually aggravate information 
asymmetries. As bank competition is increased and interest rates go down, borrowers may have 
an incentive to end long-lasting relationships with their banks. When borrowers switch to other 
banks, the information that the previous bank has collected with respect to their borrowers is no 
longer of value, increasing information asymmetries.  
Increased competition between banks may also lead to a reduction in franchise value 
which, in turn, may lead to increased risk taking. As less efficient banks fail to compete by 
reducing overhead costs, they may adopt a gambling strategy, i.e. they reduce collection of 
information and monitoring efforts in order to remain profitable (Hellmann et al., 2000; Andersen 
and Tarp, 2003). While in the long run inefficient banks will likely be replaced by more efficient 
ones (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2008), at least in the short run, financial liberalization may thus 
lead to instability instead of efficiency.  
Finally, several authors stress that capital inflows following financial liberalization are 
often of a speculative nature and do not lead to long-run investments (Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 
2000). This may lead to sudden capital outflows, potentially followed by banks runs and banking 
crises (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Rodrik, 1998).  
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The criticism on the positive view of financial liberalization has been corroborated by 
experiences from practice. Several countries have experienced deep financial crises, in several 
cases accompanied by sharp economic downturns. The recent global financial and economic 
crisis of 2007-2008 is a clear example of this, but also the crises experienced by the Southeast 
Asian countries in 1997-1999, Mexico in 1996, Argentina and Chile in the early 1980s  are a case 
in point. 
Empirical studies find mixed results with respect to the effectiveness of financial 
liberalization in stimulating financial development. While the net effect of financial liberalization 
appears to be positive (Huang 2011), there is large heterogeneity between countries and time 
periods. In light of this heterogeneity, recent empirical literature has started to identify the 
prerequisites of successful financial liberalization policies. Several studies have focused on the 
importance of effective bank regulation and supervision. Hermes and Meesters (2015) find that 
the impact of financial liberalization on bank efficiency is conditional on the quality of regulation 
and supervision of the banking system. This result is corroborated by study from the International 
Monetary Fund (2015), which finds evidence that financial development is positively related to 
the quality of the regulatory framework, as measured by compliance with Basel Core Principles 
on banking supervision and the Insurance Core Principles. These results support the view that 
proper financial market regulation and supervision are necessary to make sure that imprudent 
behavior of banks and other financial institutions is effectively curbed (Andersen and Tarp, 
2003), preventing these institutions in competitive environments (i.e. after liberalizing the 
financial sector) from taking on more risk than is socially desirable. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find evidence that a weak institutional 
environment – using measures of the rule of law, level of corruption, law enforcement and 
bureaucratic efficiency – and the absence of proper regulation and supervision makes the 
occurrence of financial crises more likely. Their study suggests that institutional quality and 
proper regulation and supervision appear to be important prerequisites for successful financial 
liberalization. In a similar vein, Klein and Olivei (2008) show that capital account liberalization 
promotes financial development. Yet, this result is primarily driven by developed countries, in 
which institutions and bank regulation and supervision are generally more developed. For 
developing countries, having lower levels of institutional quality and bank regulation and 
supervision, capital account liberalization fails to promote financial development.  
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To conclude, recent empirical studies suggest that without proper regulation, supervision 
and without the right institutional environment financial liberalization may not meet the 
expectations of improving financial development.  
 
2.2 Financial development, financial liberalization and the role of social capital 
Coleman (1988) introduced the notion of social capital as a resource – similar to human and 
physical capital – on which individuals can draw when producing or trading with other market 
participants. Social capital can present itself in the form of interpersonal trust, information 
sharing, and social norms. Higher levels of social capital (i.e. environments in which 
interpersonal trust, free information sharing and strict social norms are stronger) may be 
associated with better economic outcomes as they allow individuals to be more productive.  
Since the 1990s, social capital has been introduced in empirical studies as a potentially 
important determinant of economic growth. Overall, these studies suggest that social capital 
indeed positively contributes to economic growth (La Porta et al., 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Zak and Knack, 2001). Several studies stress that one main reasons why social capital promotes 
growth is that it can be an effective substitute of absent or failing formal institutions (Ahlerup et 
al., 2008). The substitutability between formal institutions and social capital rests on two pillars. 
First, by trusting one another two parties can engage in transactions that could otherwise only be 
conducted if (enforceable) contracts were specified (Knack and Keefer 1997; Fukuyama 1995). 
Second, substitutability between formal regulation and social capital also requires that both 
parties are correct to trust each other. In this respect, Boix and Posner (1998) argue that norms 
and expectations of appropriate behavior induce people to comply with existing rules and 
regulations, even if enforcement mechanisms are absent. Thus, by trusting each other people 
behave in ways not to break this trust.  
 Social capital has also been introduced in the literature on financial development. Yet, 
studies using social capital to explain financial development are scarce. Guiso et al. (2004) show 
that households and firms located in high trust areas have a higher likelihood of obtaining credit 
when they need it. Moreover, they find that households and firms in high trust areas invest more 
in stocks and use more personal checks. They argue that persons living in high trust areas have 
less fear that a financial institution expropriates their assets, leading them to save more. Similarly, 
financial institutions in high trust areas provide more loans as they have less fear that the loans 
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will not be repaid. Calderon et al. (2002) find similar results in a cross-country setting. In 
particular, they find that countries with a higher level of social capital tend to have larger 
financial sectors.  
The role of social capital is also investigated in research on the effectiveness of 
microfinance. Group lending, being the dominant lending technique in microfinance, rests on the 
principle of high trust and strong social ties among group members who are jointly responsible 
for the repayment of the group loan. Several studies have shown that repayment performance is 
determined by the existence of high levels of social capital (Karlan, 2007; Cassar et al, 2007, 
Dufhues et al., 2011 and 2013; Postelnicu et al., 2015).  
The results of these studies suggest that higher levels of social capital are associated with 
higher levels of financial development. Yet, next to this direct relationship, social capital may 
also indirectly affect financial development by having an impact on the relationship between 
financial liberalization and financial development. As argued in the literature, institutional quality 
is an important prerequisite for the effectiveness of financial liberalization policies in stimulating 
financial development. At the same time, it has also been shown that failing institutions may be 
substituted for by social capital. Combining these two findings leads us to argue that the 
effectiveness of financial liberalization in improving financial development may be strong, even 
if the institutional quality is low, in the presence of high levels of social capital. 
The intuition behind this argument can be illustrated as follows. When financial 
liberalization policies are carried out in the presence of weak institutions, individuals may only 
choose to increase their savings rate if they have enough trust that their funds are being held 
responsibly by banks. Similarly, on the supply side, banks may only find proper investment 
opportunities for their increased availability of funds if the prevailing level of social capital is 
high enough to ensure timely repayment. Finally, the extent to which clients switch banks after 
financial liberalization – which would lead to the loss of valuable information (Boot, 2000) – 
may be reduced in the presence of high levels of  social capital as this is expected to keep clients 
from ending long-lasting relationships with their bank. Based on the above discussion, we 
hypothesize that the association between financial liberalization and financial development is 





3. Methodology and data 
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where 	
 refers to financial development, 	 refers to the level of financial 
liberalization,	 refers to the level of social capital,  ∗ 	 is an interaction term between 
social capital and financial liberalization and # is a vector of control variables. The indices i and t 
refer to country and time, respectively. The model is specified as a growth on levels regression 
equation with non-overlapping data periods, similar to the specification of Chinn and Ito (2006). 
More specifically, we use data for the period 1973-2008 and calculate the four-year average 
growth rate of the level of financial development as the dependent variable. All independent 
variables are measured as the level of these variables at the end of the previous period. Thus, the 
growth of financial development for the period 1974-1977 is explained by the levels of the 
independent variables in 1973, etc. The dataset contains information for 82 countries. 
In the literature, financial development has been measured in various ways. These 
measures refer to different dimensions of financial development. In most of the literature, the  
measures used focus on financial deepening, i.e. the extent to which financial institutions increase 
the size and variety of financial services offered to economic agents. We follow a similar strategy 
and use total financial system deposits to GDP (DEPGDP), private credit to GDP (PRCGDP) and 
liquid liabilities to GDP (LLY) to measure financial deepening. All data are retrieved from the 
Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), which has been developed by the World Bank 
(Čihák et al., 2012). Since we have three measures of financial deepening, we estimate three 
different versions of our model as shown in equation (1), each version using a different measure 
of financial deepening. Similar to what is standard in the growth literature, we include the level 
of financial development at the end of the previous four-year period (also termed as the initial 
level) as one of the independent variables to control for potential convergence of the growth rate 
of financial development across countries. 
Financial liberalization (	) is measured based on a dataset developed by Abiad et 
al. (2010). This dataset includes various dimensions of financial liberalization, including 
measures of reducing or removing restrictions on international capital flows, credit controls and 
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excessively high reserve requirements, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, and 
interest rate controls. Each country in the dataset is rated every year on a scale from 0 to 3 with 
respect to these five dimensions, where 0 refers to complete repression and 3 refers to a 
completely liberalized financial sector with respect to a specific dimension. We take the sum of 
these five dimensions, which means that our financial liberalization variable that can take on 
values between 0 and 15. 
Social capital () is measured using data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The 
WVS is a compilation of national surveys on values and norms, carried out in six time waves 
(1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1995-1997, 1999-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014). In our study, we 
make use of data from the first five waves. Our measure of social capital is based on the 
following specific question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?”, where respondents (a minimum of 
thousand per time wave per country) can choose among the options “Most people can be trusted”, 
“You cannot be too careful”, or “Don’t know”. This approach has been used in several other 
studies as a measure of social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Ahlerup et al., 2008; Beugelsdijk 
and Maseland, 2011).1 In order to be able to include the trust data in our analysis, we follow a 
common procedure in existing literature by excluding the non-respondents and subsequently 
calculating the proportion of people who answered the question with “Most people can be 
trusted” (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Calderon et al., 2002; Kouvavas and ten Kate, 2013).2 In cases 
where the same country was included in multiple waves, we calculate the average level of trust 
over time and assume that this average describes a country’s level of trust in the period 1973-
2008. This assumption is based on the claim made elsewhere in the literature that social capital is 
changing only very slowly over time (Algan and Cahuc, 2010). It is also corroborated by the data 
we use: the average correlation between different WVS waves of answers to the trust question is 
                                                           
1
 For those countries that are not included in any of the WVS waves, we use data from the Institute of Social Studies 
and the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS)/Eurobarometer, which are organizations that include the same 
question in their surveys. ESDS allows respondents to rate their answer on a scale from 1 to 9. We rescaled the 
answers from this source by taking the proportion of respondents that answered the question with a 1, 2, 3 or 4 and 
label them as answering the trust question with “most people can be trusted”.  
2
 We do acknowledge that using survey data to measure social capital may be criticized. In particular, this approach 
may lead to different interpretations of what respondents see as social capital. For example, they may think of 
different people when they are asked whether ‘most people’ can be trusted. What is more, this difference may be 
determined by culture (Delhey et al., 2011). One suggestion for future research would thus be to include more than 
one proxy for social capital, for example measures of social capital that do not rely on survey data. 
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higher than 0.8. The fact that social capital appears to be relatively unchanged over time does 
lead us to the conclusion that it can be treated as an exogenous variable in the analysis. 
As is clear from the specification of the econometric model in equation (1), formal 
institutions are not directly entering the analysis. Instead, the role of institutions is analyzed 
indirectly by creating sub-samples of countries based on the overall quality of the formal 
institutional setting. Formal institutions are measured using data from the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI). This is a widely used database covering different dimensions of institutions 
including the rule of law, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, control over 
corruption and regulatory quality. We add the quality of banking regulation and supervision (data 
from Abiad et al., 2010) as a sixth dimension, because this formal institutional dimension is of 
particular interest in the context of our study. As is shown in appendix table A.2 the institutional 
variables are highly correlated. This leads us to decide to use principal component analysis (PCA) 
to effectively capture the variation in these variables into one specific component.3 The results of 
the PCA are presented in appendix table A.3 and appendix figure A.1. Table A.3 shows that the 
first principal component explains over 80 percent of the variation of the six underlying 
institutional variables. Moreover, as is shown in figure A.1, it is the only (principal) component 
with an eigenvalue greater than 1. We take this component as our variable measuring the quality 
of the formal institutional environment (measured by the six different dimensions) in a country 
and use this in the empirical analysis. We name this variable INSTITUTIONS. A higher value of 
this variable represents a higher value of the quality of the formal institutional environment in a 
country.  
We include several control variables in vector #. These variables have been suggested by 
the financial development literature (Huang, 2011). In particular, we include the initial levels of 
GDP (GDP), the trade to GDP ratio (TRADE), the inflation rate (INFLATION), population size 
(POPULATION), an index variable measuring the extent to which the country functions as a 
democracy (DEMOC) and an index variable measuring the existence of political constraints that 
prevent policy changes from being implemented (POLCON). Data for GDP, TRADE, 
                                                           
3
 While the institutional variables may vary over time, we take the weighted average for each variable per country 
before performing the principal component analysis. This means we assume that the quality of formal institutions is 
constant over time and can be extrapolated backwards in time. Although this may appear restrictive, the average 
correlation between 1996 (the first year for which we have data on formal institutions from the WGI database) and 
2010 (the last year from which we use the WGI database)  is higher than 0.9. We use this approach because this 
allows us to create data on the formal institutional environment for the years before 1996.  
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INFLATION and POPULATION come from the GFDD. These variables are expected to be 
positively associated with our measures of financial development.  Data for DEMOC are 
retrieved from the Polity IV database; data for POLCON are taken from a database compiled by 
Henisz (2002). For both variables, a higher score on the index (i.e. becoming more a democracy 
or facing less political constraints) is expected to positively related to financial development.4  
 The social capital variable is time-invariant. Ideally, therefore, we would like to use a 
specification that allows time-invariant variables to be included, e.g. a pooled or random effects 
specification. However, a Hausman test shows that using a pooled OLS or random effects model 
would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. Hence, equation (1) is specified as a fixed effects 
model, which means that  is omitted. We are thus primarily interested in the coefficient . 
Technically, the marginal effect of financial liberalization on financial development growth can 
be written as %&'()*+,
%&-./-0
=	 +	 ∗ .
 Since  is always positive, a positive coefficient  
indicates that the effect of financial liberalization on financial development growth is stronger for 
higher levels of social capital is, which supports our hypothesis. Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. 
 
<Insert table 1 here> 
 
<Insert table 2 here> 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Main results 
The results of estimating the model expressed in equation (1) are presented in tables 3a to 3c. 
Table 3a shows that if we take into account all countries and years, our financial liberalization 
measure, as well as its interaction with social capital, is never significant. Of the control 
variables, the coefficients of the initial values of financial deepening are always negative and 
highly significant, suggesting that convergence of the growth rate of financial development 
across countries is indeed taking place. This result is found consistently in all the regressions we 
                                                           
4
 An overview of all variables used in the analysis and their respective sources can be found in appendix table A.1. 
Table A.4 provides the list of countries included in the dataset. 
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perform. Moreover, the coefficients of the variables TRADE and GDP are significant and have 
the expected sign. 
 Next, we focus on sub-samples of countries with high and low quality of formal 
institutions. Countries with high (low) quality of formal institutions have above (below) median 
values of the variable INSTITUTIONS.  If we estimate equation (1) using data of countries with 
high quality of formal institutions, we find no significant results for the coefficient of financial 
liberalization (results displayed in table 3b). We also find no effect for the interaction term 
between financial liberalization and social capital. So, in countries with high levels of formal 
institutions, financial liberalization does not have an impact on financial deepening. This also 
holds for countries with high levels of social capital.  
Redoing the analysis using data of countries with low quality of formal institutions shows 
that we find weak evidence that financial liberalization positively affects financial development 
and that this relationship is stronger in countries with high levels of social capital (results shown 
in table 3c). This conclusion is based on the fact that we find significant results for our measure 
of financial liberalization and its interaction with our measure of social capital for one of three 
measures of financial development (LLY). The signs of the coefficients for these two variables are 
as expected but not significant for the other two measures of financial development (DEPGDP 
and PRCGDP). Thus, there is weak evidence that for countries with low quality of formal 
institutions social capital may act as a substitute in moderating the positive impact of financial 
liberalization on financial development. 
 
<Insert tables 3a to 3c here> 
 
Thus far, the empirical analysis does not strongly support our hypothesis. One reason we 
find only weak support may be due to the fact that financial liberalization policies only really 
took off from the late 1980s, i.e. when the Washington consensus became the dominant 
macroeconomic policy framework in many (especially developing) economies. As is shown in 
figure 1, from 1989 there is a significant jump in the values of our financial liberalization 
variable, in particular for developing economies. Before 1989, 	 remains relatively stable 
for developed as well as developing economies. At the same time, figure 2 shows that our 
measures of financial development fluctuate over time, especially for the sample of developing 
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countries. Yet, the overall trend in these variables for all countries (developing as well as 
developed) is that they are moving upward. Based on these findings, we argue that a positive 
relationship between financial liberalization and financial development, and the impact of social 
capital on this relationship, may only occur after 1989. Thus, social capital may act as a substitute 
for weak formal institutions, especially when the implementation of financial liberalization 
policies is relatively strong. 
 
<Insert figure 1 here> 
 
<Insert figure 2 here> 
 
Tables 4a to 4c shows the results of estimating equation (1) using data for all countries in 
our sample for the post-Washington consensus period (i.e. from 1989 to 2008) only. Table 4a 
shows that the coefficient for 	 is always negative, but only when we use LLY it is 
statistically significant. This suggests that financial liberalization as such does not have an impact 
(or may even have a negative impact) on financial development in the post-Washington 
consensus period. This outcome fits at least part of the existing literature, in which it is argued 
that financial liberalization as such may reduce effective financial intermediation (Stiglitz, 2000; 
Boot, 2000) and that financial liberalization only has a positive impact on financial development 
in the presence of well-developed formal institutions.  
At the same time, the coefficient for the interaction between financial liberalization and 
social capital is always positive and significant. Figures 3a to 3c, which present the joint effect of 
financial liberalization and the interaction of this variable with the social capital variable, shows 
that the overall effect of both variables on financial development is positive for reasonable levels 
of financial liberalization. In particular, these figures show that the marginal effect of financial 
liberalization on financial development turns from being negative and significant to positive and 
significant as the level of social capital increases. As argued above, this may be because social 
capital and formal institutions are substitutes. These results suggest that, at least for the period 
1989-2008, financial liberalization has a positive impact on financial development in countries 
with higher levels of social capital.  
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Redoing the analysis for countries with high quality of formal institutions yields no 
significant results (results displayed in table 4b). This suggests that for countries with high 
quality of formal institutions, social capital is not a substitute, not even during a period in which 
financial liberalization policies are relatively strong. When we redo the analysis with data from 
countries with low quality of formal institutions, we find strong support for our hypothesis (table 
4c). First of all, for all three variables of financial development, the coefficient for the financial 
liberalization variable is negative and significant. Thus, in these countries financial liberalization 
during the post-Washington consensus period actually negatively contributes to financial 
development. Second, the coefficient for the interaction term between financial liberalization and 
social capital is always positive and significant. This outcome suggests that in countries with low 
quality of formal institutions and high levels of social capital, financial liberalization has a 
positive impact on financial development, since social capital may substitute for low quality of 
formal institutions. Figures 4a to 4c, in which we present the joint effect of financial 
liberalization and the interaction of this variable with the social capital variable, shows that the 
overall effect of both variables on financial development is positive for reasonable levels of 
financial liberalization. More specifically, these figures show for the post-Washington consensus 
period how the interaction effect changes when we move from a sample consisting of countries 
with very poor institutional quality to countries with very high institutional quality. These figures 
clearly show that the interaction effect becomes weaker when the quality of formal institutions 
increases, and that the interaction term is significant and positive for samples with low 
institutional quality. This can be considered as evidence that social capital can take over the role 
of formal institutions when the latter are of poor quality.  
Overall, the results from our empirical analysis seem to support our hypothesis. Thus, we 
find that the association between financial liberalization and financial development is indeed 
conditional on the prevailing level of social capital. Yet, this only holds for countries with weak 
formal institutions and during a period in which financial liberalization efforts are strong (i.e. 
during the post-Washington consensus period of 1989-2008). 
 
<Insert tables 4a to 4c here> 
 




<Insert figures 4a to 4c here> 
 
Table 5 provides the list of countries that have relatively high (i.e. above the sample 
median) values of social capital, while at the same time having formal institutions of poor quality 
(i.e. below the sample median value). The list contains countries from various regions and 
continents. However, most countries are from Asia (6 of 17), Africa (5) and Eastern Europe (4); 
no countries from South America are included. Moreover, it includes only emerging economies, 
suggesting that our results hold most strongly for this group of countries. 
 
<Insert table 5 here> 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
We carry out a number of robustness checks to verify the strength of the results we have 
discussed so far. First, the empirical model expressed in equation (1) has a number of drawbacks.  
Since it is a fixed-effects model, time-invariant variables cannot be included. As explained, this 
also means that our social capital variable does not directly enter the empirical analysis. In the 
literature, there is some debate about the interpretability of interaction terms in case one of the 
underlying variables is omitted (i.e. social capital in our model). Whereas some studies suggest to 
simply include and interpret interaction terms when one of the interaction variables is omitted 
(Wooldridge 2009, Boyce and Wood 2011), Brambor et al. (2006) show that this may actually be 
problematic, and that both variables should ideally be included separately to get consistent 
estimates. 
One way to get around this problem is to include group means of the time-variant 
independent variables and subtract the group means from these time-variant variables, a 
procedure known in the literature as cluster-mean centering (Antonakis et al., 2010; Dieleman 
and Templin 2014). By doing so, the model becomes a within-between estimation, which is a 
slight adjustment of the Mundlak (1978) specification. 5 The model now reads as: 
                                                           
5
 The exact Mundlak specification would read as: ℎ			
, =  +	2# 3 + #4555 	+  + 6 +
$ in this case, coefficient would reflect the difference between the between and the within effect, which is less 
easily interpretable as  in the model above, which only measures the between effect. The coefficient  is equal in 






 =  +	2#
 − #45553 + #4555 	+ 
 + 6 + $ 																									        (2) 
 
where # contains all time-variant variables (i.e. 	
,  ∗ 	, 	, and the vector of 
control variables) and #5 contains the group level means (measured from  − 5	onwards) of the 
time-variant variables. 6 Again, we use the 4-year period growth rate of financial development as 
the dependent variable, with the level values just prior to the 4-year period (i.e. at  − 5) as the 
independent variables. Mundlak (1978) shows that in such a specification,  captures the within-
group variation over time and that this coefficient is exactly equal to the coefficient of a fixed-
effects estimation, even when the unobserved effects are assumed to be random.7 The between 
effects of the time-variant averages are captured by coefficient . As this model is measured 
assuming random effects, social capital is not omitted and hence  can be used to measure the 
(between) effect of the prevailing level of social capital on financial development. As both terms 
of the interaction term are now included separately, the interaction term can be properly 
interpreted (Bell and Jones, 2015).8 Table 6 presents the results of the estimations of equation (2). 
We show the results for the sub-sample of countries with weak quality of formal institutions and  
use data for the post-Washington consensus period only. 9 As is clear from this table, the results 
are similar to those presented in table 4c. The coefficients for the interaction term and the 
financial liberalization term are always significant and do not switch sign. Moreover, the 
coefficient of the social capital variable is only significant (and positive) for one of three 
specifications (i.e. when we use LLY as our measure of financial development), suggesting that 
the direct relationship between the level of social capital and financial development is weak.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
equation is that there is no correlation between # 	and #4555 in my model (as opposed to the Mundlak model). This 
leads to more precise estimates. Although the model thus is slightly different, for matters of convenience I refer to 
this model as “the Mundlak model”. 
6
 #4555 is thus the average of the level of # in country i, where # is measured at t-5, t-9, t-14 etc.  
7
 Naturally, this only is the case as long as the fixed-effects regression contains the same variables as the Mundlak 
regression.  
8
 Despite the attractive features of the within-between estimation, there is some debate on the interpretability of time-
invariant variables in these specifications (social capital in our case). More specifically, while the estimated 
coefficients of time-invariant variables may be consistent, the standard errors can become too small (especially when 
the time invariant effect is correlated with the individual effect), leading to potential incorrect conclusions 
concerning the statistical significance of these variables (Krishnakumar, 2006; Chatelain and Ralf, 2010). Coefficient 
 (i.e. the coefficient for social capital) should thus be interpreted with caution. 
9
 The results for the other samples are not reported, but are very similar to the results presented in tables 3 and 4. The 
results of these other samples are available on request from the authors. 
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<Insert table 6 here> 
 
As a second robustness check, we use five- instead of four-year average growth rates of 
the levels of financial development. All independent variables are again measured as the level of 
these variables at the end of the of the previous period. Thus, the growth of financial 
development for the period 1974-1978 is explained by the levels of the independent variables in 
1973, etc. The results of the analysis, using data for the post-Washington consensus period and 
for countries with weak formal institutions only, are reported in table 7. These results are very 
similar to those reported earlier in table 4c. The results for other periods and countries (not 
shown) are also similar to those reported earlier in tables 3 and 4.10 The results from this 
robustness check confirm that the association between financial liberalization and financial 
development is conditional on the prevailing level of social capital; yet, this only holds for 
countries with weak formal institutions and during a period in which financial liberalization 
efforts are strong.  
 
<Insert table 7 here> 
 
 Third, we carry out the same analysis, but instead of using our composite measure of 
financial liberalization policies, we replace the composite measure and use the individual policy 
measures in the regression model. Thus, we run regressions using policy variables for credit 
controls and excessively high reserve requirements, bank entry barriers, state ownership in the 
banking sector, interest rate controls, and restrictions on international capital flows. The results 
are shown in tables 8a to 8e and are generally similar to the results discussed earlier. Thus, again 
it is confirmed that the association between financial liberalization and financial development is 
conditional on the prevailing level of social capital, but this is only true for countries with weak 
formal institutions and during a period in which financial liberalization efforts are strong. Yet, the 
results in tables 8a to 8e also make clear that this result depends at least to some extent on the 
type of financial liberalization measures taken. In particular, the support for our hypothesis is 
most strongly confirmed when governments reduce or remove entry barriers for new banks. In all 
three regressions, the coefficient for the variable measuring the extent to which entry barriers are 
                                                           
10
 The results for the other periods and countries are available on request from the authors. 
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removed is negative and significant, while at the same time the coefficient of the interaction term 
between entry barriers variable and the social capital variable is positive and significant. The 
results are also supporting our hypothesis when the focus is on removing or reducing interest rate 
and credit controls, and/or controls on international capital flows, in particular when we use LLY 
and PRCGDP as our measures of financial development. We find no results, however, when 
governments reduce their direct involvement in the financial sector as owners of banks (table 8d). 
Apparently, this type of policies does not contribute to financial development. This is true in 
general, as well as for countries with high levels of social capital during and weak formal 
institutions. 
 
<Insert tables 8a to 8e here> 
 
 Finally, we redo the regressions and experiment with the set of countries we include in the 
analysis to verify whether the results may be specific for specific regions of countries. In 
particular, we run regressions in which we leave out all Asian countries that were hit by the Asian 
crisis (i.e. China, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia the Philippines). Again, the results (not shown) 
from this robustness check confirm our earlier findings, i.e. the association between financial 
liberalization and financial development is conditional on the prevailing level of social capital, 
but this is only true for countries with weak formal institutions and during a period in which 
financial liberalization efforts are strong.11 This outcome does not seem to be specific to countries 
from different regions. 
 
4.3 Summary of the results 
Summarizing the results from this study, the relationship between financial liberalization and 
financial development appears to be conditional on the prevailing level social capital, which 
confirms our main hypothesis. Yet, this conditionality is mostly relevant for countries with weak 
formal institutions and during the so-called post-Washington consensus period when financial 
liberalization policies really took off. In case countries have developed formal institutions of 
higher quality, social capital is no longer of significant influence in determining the success of 
financial liberalization. These results suggest that social capital may act as a substitute for weakly 
                                                           
11
 Again, these results are available on request from the authors. 
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developed formal institutions in determining the relationship between financial liberalization and 
financial development.  
We explain these results by pointing out that financial liberalization policies in emerging 
economies accelerated from the late 1990s onwards. These countries acted upon the advice of the 
Washington consensus, which stipulated that countries could benefit from liberalizing their 
financial sectors (Gore, 2000). However, as these countries did not have the proper institutional 
environment, financial liberalization often failed to promote financial development for many of 
these countries. This is in line with the evidence found in several empirical studies on the impact 
of financial liberalization policies on financial development and economic growth. These studies 
have identified institutional quality as an important prerequisite for successful financial 
liberalization policies. The results of our study suggest that social capital can be a substitute for 
formal institutional quality. Consequently, countries with high levels of social capital managed to 
benefit from financial liberalization in the post-Washington consensus period, despite the low 
quality of their formal institutions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated why the effects of financial liberalization on financial 
development differ among countries. While the existing literature provides several answers to this 
question, we contribute by identifying an important prerequisite to successful financial 
liberalization, i.e. social capital. By performing an empirical analysis using panel data on 82 
countries in the period 1973-2008, we find evidence that the success of financial liberalization in 
promoting financial development is conditional on the prevailing level of social capital. The 
conditional impact of social capital on the relationship between financial liberalization and 
financial development is especially strong during the so-called post-Washington consensus 
period and for countries with a weak institutional environment. Moreover, we show that this 
outcome is especially relevant for emerging economies and for different types of financial 
liberalization policies, except for policies aiming at reducing the state ownership of banks. These 
results remain robust after performing a range of different robustness analyses. 
We interpret these results as follows. During the post-Washington consensus period (i.e. 
from 1989 onwards), many emerging economies liberalized their financial sectors as this was the 
generally accepted view on how to carry out growth-enhancing macroeconomic policies. At the 
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same time, several of these countries did not develop the necessary formal institutions to make 
sure financial liberalization would lead to higher levels of financial development. As a result, 
financial liberalization generally failed to promote financial development in these countries. 
However, for some of these countries, a high prevailing level of social capital could effectively 
take over the role of formal institutions, thereby ensuring that financial liberalization did 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics       
 
      
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max 
 















DEPGDP 2446 0.42 0.34 0.33 0.00 2.85 
PRCGDP 2468 0.47 0.41 0.30 0.00 2.28 
       
 
Independent variables       
SC 2819 0.26 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.75 
FINLIB 2557 8,18 4,17 8,75 0.00 15.0 
  Credit controls 2557 1.62 1.11 1.50 0.00 3.00 
  Interest rate controls 2557 1.79 1.33 3.00 0.00 3.00 
  Entry barriers 2557 1.80 1.19 2.00 0.00 3.00 
  Privatization 2557 1.28 1.19 1.00 0.00 3.00 
  International capital flows 2557 1.69 1.13 2.00 0.00 3.00 
       
 















INFLATION 2560 0.12 0.15 0.08 -0.11 1.00 
TRADE 2678 0.66 0.50 0.55 0.06 4.40 
POPULATION 2818 5.58e+07 1.57e+08 1.50e+07 1.30e+06 1.30e+09 
DEMOC 2818 13.59 6.85 17.00 0.00 20.00 
POLCON 2772 0.30 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.72 
       
 
Additional variables (used in the principal component 
analysis) 
Rule of law 2818 0.20 1.03 -0.01 -1.43 1.94 
Voice and accountability 2818 0.22 0.91 0.01 -1.85 1.62 
Government effectiveness 2818 0.35 1.00 -0.02 -1.05 2.14 
Control of corruption 2818 0.28 1.11 -0.13 -1.16 2.44 
Regulatory quality 2818 0.35 0.92 0.22 -1.74 1.97 







Table 2: Pair wise correlation matrix 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 




1.00            
[2] DEPGDP 0.94 1.00 
          
[3] PRCGDP 0.85 0.87 1.00 
         
 










1.00         
[5[ SC*FINLIB 0.34 0.37 0.52 0.94 1.00        
[6] FINLIB 0.11 0.24 0.28 0.19 0.47 1.00 
      
 
















1.00      
[8] INFLATION -0.53 -0.50 -0.51 -0.34 -0.35 -0.23 -0.33 1.00 
    
[9] TRADE 0.41 0.44 0.34 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.01 -0.24 1.00 
   
[10] POPULATION 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.14 -0.31 -0.45 0.44 0.09 -0.32 1.00 
  
[11] DEMOC -0.02 0.11 0.20 0.27 0.39 0.36 0.31 0.09 -0.08 -0.26 1.00 
 
[12] POLCON 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.14 0.24 0.30 0.20 -0.03 -0.04 -0.19 0.52 1.00 
 







Table 3a: Financial liberalization, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for 
all years and all countries 
 LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
    
LLY(-1) -0.779   
 (4.63)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.246  
  (4.01)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.232 
   (6.68)*** 
    
FINLIB(-1) -0.012 0.000 0.001 
 (1.25) (0.11) (0.38) 
SC*FINLIB(-1) 0.028 -0.002 0.010 
 (1.46) (0.16) (1.10) 
TRADE(-1) 0.144 0.043 0.045 
 (2.63)** (2.20)** (1.80)* 
DEMOC(-1) 0.004 0.000 0.000 
 (0.72) (0.10) (0.03) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.012 0.002 0.000 
 (1.20) (0.43) (0.00) 
GDP(-1) 0.091 0.028 0.049 
 (2.09)** (2.85)*** (4.50)*** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.011 -0.012 -0.092 
 (0.12) (0.37) (2.21)** 
POLCON(-1) 0.022 0.000 -0.034 
 (0.26) (0.00) (0.99) 
CONSTANT -2.115 -0.388 0.422 
 (1.48) (0.77) (0.59) 
    
R2 0.14 0.13 0.15 
N 512 509 512 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  
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Table 3b: Financial liberalization, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for 
countries with high quality of formal institutions 
 LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
    
LLY(-1) -0.376   
 (5.53)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.163  
  (2.64)**  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.149 
   (5.77)*** 
    
FINLIB(-1) 0.006 0.001 0.006 
 (0.87) (0.30) (1.17) 
SC*FINLIB(-1) -0.007 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.47) (0.50) (0.07) 
TRADE(-1) 0.083 0.034 0.051 
 (1.70)* (1.43) (1.63) 
DEMOC(-1) -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 
 (2.06)** (1.54) (0.69) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.018 0.007 -0.005 
 (1.10) (0.75) (0.71) 
GDP(-1) 0.047 0.040 0.026 
 (1.70)* (2.09)** (1.96)* 
POPULATION(-1) -0.132 -0.066 -0.033 
 (0.95) (0.98) (0.48) 
POLCON(-1) -0.030 0.010 -0.124 
 (0.38) (0.19) (2.54)** 
CONSTANT 1.244 0.240 -0.011 
 (0.64) (0.26) (0.01) 
    
R2 0.19 0.11 0.23 
N 225 224 228 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All 
independent variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard 





Table 3c: Financial liberalization, financial development and the role of social capital: Results 
for countries with low quality of formal institutions 
 
LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
 
   
LLY(-1) -1.486   
 
(4.96)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.513  
 
 (6.31)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.540 
 
  (5.83)*** 
 
   
FINLIB(-1) -0.026 -0.002 0.001 
 
(2.30)** (0.57) (0.17) 
SC*FINLIB(-1) 0.079 0.017 0.020 
 
(2.84)*** (1.48) (1.16) 
TRADE(-1) 0.355 0.088 0.079 
 
(3.14)*** (2.40)** (1.68)* 
DEMOC(-1) 0.004 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.56) (0.28) (0.16) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.016 -0.001 0.005 
 
(1.42) (0.31) (0.75) 
GDP(-1) 0.154 0.029 0.066 
 
(2.16)** (1.87)* (3.28)*** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.011 -0.011 -0.156 
 
(0.08) (0.23) (2.46)** 
POLCON(-1) 0.112 0.023 0.004 
 
(0.89) (0.72) (0.08) 
CONSTANT -3.496 -0.403 1.186 
 
(1.84)* (0.60) (1.08) 
R2 0.21 0.23 0.24 
N 287 285 284 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that are 





Table 4a: Financial liberalization, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for 
all countries, 1989-2008 
 LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
    
LLY(-1) -0.946   
 (6.03)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.295  
  (4.55)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.290 
   (5.56)*** 
    
FINLIB(-1) -0.052 -0.015 -0.015 
 (2.36)** (1.61) (1.37) 
SC*FINLIB(-1) 0.218 0.063 0.088 
 (3.07)*** (1.94)* (2.00)** 
TRADE(-1) 0.083 0.016 -0.020 
 (0.79) (0.50) (0.38) 
DEMOC(-1) 0.002 -0.000 0.006 
 (0.34) (0.03) (1.79)* 
INFLATION(-1) -0.010 0.002 0.009 
 (0.84) (0.46) (1.15) 
GDP(-1) 0.135 0.041 0.086 
 (2.50)** (2.47)** (3.08)*** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.198 0.015 -0.093 
 (0.93) (0.22) (0.84) 
POLCON(-1) -0.002 -0.001 -0.043 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.70) 
CONSTANT -6.313 -1.134 -0.497 
 (1.62) (1.03) (0.28) 
    
R2 0.23 0.17 0.23 
N 303 302 305 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that are 





Table 4b: Financial liberalization, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for 
countries with high quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 
 
LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
 
   
LLY(-1) -0.476   
 
(5.47)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.187  
 
 (2.76)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.192 
 
  (5.41)*** 
 
   
FINLIB(-1) 0.009 0.006 0.001 
 
(0.35) (0.76) (0.04) 
SC*FINLIB(-1) 0.044 0.000 0.058 
 
(0.56) (0.01) (0.65) 
TRADE(-1) 0.000 -0.009 0.015 
 
(0.00) (0.28) (0.38) 
DEMOC(-1) -0.061 -0.012 -0.006 
 
(1.88)* (1.79)* (0.41) 
INFLATION(-1) 0.002 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.17) (0.56) (0.72) 
GDP(-1) 0.165 0.072 0.121 
 
(2.34)** (3.68)*** (5.09)*** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.184 0.084 -0.205 
 
(0.64) (1.10) (1.94)* 
POLCON(-1) -0.012 0.045 0.009 
 
(0.06) (0.44) (0.10) 
CONSTANT -6.080 -2.936 0.272 
 
(1.59) (2.65)** (0.15) 
 
   
R2 0.32 0.17 0.42 
N 127 126 130 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that are 





Table 4c: Financial liberalization, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for 
countries with low quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 
 
LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
 
   
LLY(-1) -1.709   
 
(7.22)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.658  
 
 (5.98)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.800 
 
  (7.15)*** 
 
   
FINLIB(-1) -0.071 -0.017 -0.019 
 
(2.75)*** (1.68)* (1.83)* 
SC*FINLIB(-1) 0.310 0.073 0.102 
 
(3.71)*** (2.20)** (2.65)** 
TRADE(-1) 0.286 0.057 -0.076 
 
(1.49) (0.98) (0.90) 
DEMOC(-1) 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.25) (0.08) (0.46) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.019 0.000 0.012 
 
(1.19) (0.05) (1.31) 
GDP(-1) 0.127 0.023 0.095 
 
(1.52) (0.89) (2.22)** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.297 0.067 -0.022 
 
(1.01) (0.76) (0.17) 
POLCON(-1) 0.040 0.001 0.017 
 
(0.38) (0.03) (0.25) 
CONSTANT -7.557 -1.493 -1.580 
 
(1.31) (0.95) (0.72) 
R2 0.33 0.33 0.40 
N 176 176 175 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis: * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
All dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that are 




Table 5: Countries with high social capital (above the median) and low quality of formal institutions 
(below the mean) 
Albania Indonesia Senegal 
Belarus Jordan Thailand 
China Madagascar Tunisia 
Dominican Republic Mozambique Ukraine 
Egypt Pakistan Vietnam 





Table 6: Financial liberalization, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for 
countries with low quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 (Mundlak model estimations) 
          LLY  DEPGDP PRCGDP 
    
LLY(-1) -1.689   
 (7.23)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.646  
  (6.75)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.800 
   (7.95)*** 
    
SC 1.352 0.044 0.487 
 (2.63)*** (0.24) (1.34) 
FINLIB(-1) -0.063 -0.015 -0.020 
 (3.49)*** (2.61)*** (2.21)** 
SC*FINLIB(-1) 0.289 0.069 0.103 
 (3.83)*** (2.86)*** (2.79)*** 
TRADE(-1) 0.325 0.063 -0.080 
 (2.10)** (1.21) (1.13) 
DEMOC(-1) 0.005 0.001 0.002 
 (0.71) (0.33) (0.48) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.016 0.001 0.012 
 (0.90) (0.13) (1.28) 
GDP(-1) 0.149 0.027 0.093 
 (2.06)** (1.13) (2.50)** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.033 0.012 -0.003 
 (1.20) (1.19) (0.15) 
POLCON(-1) 0.021 -0.003 0.018 
 (0.18) (0.07) (0.32) 
CONSTANT -0.263 -0.040 -0.197 
 (0.68) (0.29) (0.71) 
    
R2 (within) 0.32 0.33 0.39 
N 176 176 175 
Notes: All dependent variables with are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All 
independent variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. The added means of the time variant variables are estimated, 
















Table 7: Financial liberalization, financial development and the role of social capital: Results 
for countries with low quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 (Estimations with 5-year 
averages) 
           LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
    
LLY(-1) -0.558   
 (6.71)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.723  
  (7.86)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.565 
   (4.75)*** 
    
FINLIB(-1) -0.021 -0.014 -0.009 
 (2.93)*** (2.00)* (0.89) 
SC*FINLIB(-1) 0.107 0.074 0.064 
 (4.07)*** (3.30)*** (1.76)* 
TRADE(-1) 0.132 0.126 -0.147 
 (2.10)** (1.94)* (1.58) 
DEMOC(-1) -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.36) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.000 0.002 0.014 
 (0.03) (0.24) (1.37) 
GDP(-1) 0.012 0.005 0.035 
 (0.39) (0.15) (0.72) 
POPULATION(-1) 0.015 0.029 -0.026 
 (0.19) (0.32) (0.18) 
POLCON(-1) 0.018 0.013 0.050 
 (0.45) (0.33) (0.78) 
CONSTANT -0.390 -0.444 -0.137 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.06) 
    
R2 0.51 0.50 0.47 
N 129 129 129 
 
Notes: All dependent variables are measured as five-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-5 to t. All 
independent variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-6. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard 

















Table 8a: Interest rate controls, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for 
countries with low quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 
           LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
    
LLY(-1) -1.652   
 (5.38)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.642  
  (6.07)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.801 
   (6.89)*** 
    
INT(-1) -0.160 -0.046 -0.055 
 (1.71)* (1.08) (1.15) 
SC*INT(-1) 0.811 0.156 0.316 
 (2.38)** (1.08) (1.83)* 
TRADE(-1) 0.235 0.050 -0.094 
 (1.16) (0.89) (1.04) 
DEMOC(-1) 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 (0.37) (0.22) (0.53) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.017 -0.000 0.011 
 (0.96) (0.00) (1.08) 
GDP(-1) 0.099 0.028 0.092 
 (1.39) (1.18) (2.54)** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.146 0.031 -0.044 
 (0.61) (0.38) (0.35) 
POLCON(-1) -0.009 -0.011 0.009 
 (0.10) (0.31) (0.14) 
CONSTANT -4.389 -0.986 -1.140 
 (1.01) (0.75) (0.63) 
    
R2 0.30 0.31 0.40 
N 176 176 175 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
This table displays the regressions results for equation (1), where the financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) 
has been replaced by a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (INT; data from Abiad et al., 2010). All dependent 
variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that 














Table 8b: Credit controls, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for countries 
with low quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 
           
LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
 
   
LLY(-1) -1.826   
 
(7.27)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.698  
 
 (7.10)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.783 
 
  (6.70)*** 
 
   
CREDIT(-1) -0.167 -0.044 -0.046 
 
(1.92)* (1.10) (1.72)* 
SC*CREDIT(-1) 0.941 0.223 0.205 
 
(3.01)*** (1.70)* (1.96)* 
TRADE(-1) 0.272 0.054 -0.077 
 
(1.44) (0.99) (0.83) 
DEMOC(-1) 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.41) (0.16) (0.56) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.001 0.004 0.015 
 
(0.04) (0.79) (1.67) 
GDP(-1) 0.135 0.026 0.112 
 
(1.94)* (1.16) (2.91)*** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.079 0.029 -0.057 
 
(0.36) (0.36) (0.46) 
POLCON(-1) 0.012 -0.006 0.006 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.10) 
CONSTANT -4.095 -0.924 -1.399 
 
(1.01) (0.66) (0.77) 
 
   
R2 0.33 0.33 0.38 
N 176 176 175 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
This table displays the regressions results for equation (1), where the financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) 
has been replaced by a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (CREDIT; data from Abiad et al., 2010). All 
dependent variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All 
independent variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and 














Table 8c: Entry barriers, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for countries 
with low quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 
           LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
    
LLY(-1) -1.532   
 (6.64)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.642  
  (6.57)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.751 
   (6.98)*** 
    
ENTRY(-1) -0.130 -0.030 -0.065 
 (2.50)** (2.18)** (2.86)*** 
SC*ENTRY(-1) 0.550 0.103 0.242 
 (2.20)** (1.76)* (2.05)** 
TRADE(-1) 0.343 0.084 -0.034 
 (1.73)* (1.41) (0.41) 
DEMOC(-1) 0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.13) (0.01) (0.49) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.009 0.002 0.013 
 (0.56) (0.49) (1.35) 
GDP(-1) 0.140 0.033 0.115 
 (2.10)** (1.44) (3.21)*** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.093 0.017 -0.051 
 (0.35) (0.19) (0.42) 
POLCON(-1) -0.000 -0.005 0.016 
 (0.00) (0.13) (0.26) 
CONSTANT -4.508 -0.881 -1.575 
 (0.90) (0.56) (0.91) 
    
R2 0.27 0.30 0.39 
N 176 176 175 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
This table displays the regressions results for equation (1), where the financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) 
has been replaced by a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (ENTRY; data from Abiad et al., 2010). All dependent 
variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that 














Table 8d: State ownership, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for countries 
with low quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 
           
LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
 
   
LLY(-1) -1.459   
 
(4.68)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.607  
 
 (5.75)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.748 
 
  (5.96)*** 
 
   
STATE(-1) -0.056 -0.013 0.001 
 
(1.00) (0.56) (0.02) 
SC*STATE(-1) 0.153 0.098 0.020 
 
(0.66) (0.91) (0.11) 
TRADE(-1) 0.279 0.067 -0.048 
 
(1.32) (1.03) (0.56) 
DEMOC(-1) 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.33) (0.08) (0.57) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.008 0.003 0.014 
 
(0.54) (0.68) (1.48) 
GDP(-1) 0.155 0.021 0.108 
 
(1.84)* (0.84) (2.49)** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.090 0.003 -0.095 
 
(0.32) (0.04) (0.70) 
POLCON(-1) -0.036 -0.016 -0.008 
 
(0.35) (0.41) (0.13) 
CONSTANT -4.805 -0.405 -0.673 
 
(0.87) (0.27) (0.30) 
 
   
R2 0.25 0.29 0.36 
N 176 176 175 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
This table displays the regressions results for equation (1), where the financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) 
has been replaced by a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (STATE; data from Abiad et al., 2010). All dependent 
variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that 














Table 8e: Capital account controls, financial development and the role of social capital: Results for 
countries with low quality of formal institutions, 1989-2008 
           LLY DEPGDP PRCGDP 
    
LLY(-1) -1.455   
 (5.08)***   
DEPGDP(-1)
 
 -0.612  
  (5.77)***  
PRCGDP(-1)   -0.778 
   (7.35)*** 
    
CAP(-1) -0.129 -0.034 -0.021 
 (1.95)* (1.57) (1.06) 
SC*CAP(-1) 0.519 0.168 0.169 
 (2.34)** (1.98)* (2.72)*** 
TRADE(-1) 0.302 0.074 -0.034 
 (1.46) (1.15) (0.42) 
DEMOC(-1) 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.25) (0.05) (0.50) 
INFLATION(-1) -0.013 0.002 0.013 
 (0.94) (0.36) (1.48) 
GDP(-1) 0.123 0.020 0.098 
 (1.41) (0.78) (2.52)** 
POPULATION(-1) 0.117 0.020 -0.079 
 (0.45) (0.23) (0.63) 
POLCON(-1) -0.000 -0.009 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.22) (0.07) 
CONSTANT -4.527 -0.643 -0.721 
 (0.88) (0.42) (0.39) 
    
R2 0.28 0.31 0.38 
N 176 176 175 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis * p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
This table displays the regressions results for equation (1), where the financial liberalization composite measure (FINLIB) 
has been replaced by a measure of the extent of interest rate controls (CAP; data from Abiad et al., 2010). All dependent 
variables are measured as 4-year average growth rates, hence the average growth rate from t-4 to t. All independent 
variables with (-1) are measured as level values at t-5. All models are estimated using fixed effects and standard errors that 













The sum of financial liberalization is measured by adding up the value of the financial liberalization index (which can take values 
between 0 and 15) for the whole sample of countries, all developing and all developed countries  for the period 1973-2005. Data for the 
financial liberalization index are taken from Abiad et al. (2010). The list of developing and developed countries included in our 

















Figure 2: Financial development over time for the whole sample (a), developing countries (b) and 
developed countries (c), 1973-2011 
(a) Whole sample 
 
(b) Developing countries 
 
(c) Developed countries 
 
 
The three figures show data for the three financial development measures used in the analyses for the whole sample, all developing 
countries and all developed countries. The data presented are standard indicators of financial sector development (in percentages of 
total GDP of a country). The data are taken from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). The list of developing and 

































































































































































Figure 3a: Marginal effects of financial liberalization on liquid liabilities to GDP  
 
 
Note: This graph displays the marginal effect of financial liberalization (solid line) on financial 
development for different values of social capital (horizontal axis). The dotted lines represent the 95 









0 0,2 0,4 0,6
 43 
 
Figure 3b: Marginal effects of financial liberalization on deposits to GDP 
 
 
Note: This graph displays the marginal effect of financial liberalization (solid line) on financial development for 
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Figure 3c: Marginal effects of financial liberalization on private credit to GDP 
 
 
Note: This graph displays the marginal effect of financial liberalization (solid line) on financial 
development for different values of social capital (horizontal axis). The dotted lines represent the 95 
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Figure 4a: Magnitude and significance of interaction term across different samples 
 
 
This graph displays the coefficient of interaction term (model 1) and the 95 percent confidence interval 
(dotted lines) when I move from a sample including only countries with very poor institutional quality (1), 
to a sample of countries with very high institutional quality (4). These samples are formed by taking 
quartiles (first, second, third and fourth) of the principal component that defines institutional quality. LLY is 
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Figure 4b: Magnitude and significance of interaction term across different samples 
 
 
This graph displays the coefficient of interaction term (model 1) and the 95 percent confidence interval 
(dotted lines) when I move from a sample including only countries with very poor institutional quality (1), 
to a sample of countries with very high institutional quality (4). These samples are formed by taking 
quartiles (first, second, third and fourth) of the principal component that defines institutional quality. 
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Figure 4c: Magnitude and significance of interaction term across different samples 
 
 
This graph displays the coefficient of interaction term (model 1) and the 95 percent confidence interval 
(dotted lines) when I move from a sample including only countries with very poor institutional quality (1), 
to a sample of countries with very high institutional quality (4). These samples are formed by taking 
quartiles (first, second, third and fourth) of the principal component that defines institutional quality. 
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Table A.1: Data description and sources 
 
Short Definition Source 
Dependent variables   
   
LLY Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) Global Financial Development  
Database (GFDD) 
DEPGDP Financial system deposits to GDP (%) GFDD 
PRCGDP 
 





   
SC The average proportion of people within a country that have answered “most people 
can be trusted” to the following question: Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 
World Values Survey 
FINLIB Measures the existence of credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barrier in the 
financial sector, state ownership in the banking sector and restrictions on international 
capital flows, see below. 
Abiad (2010) 
  Credit controls and reserve   
  requirements 
Measures whether there are ceilings on credit towards certain sectors, whether there 
are high reserve requirements and whether there is directed credit towards favored 
sectors or industries.  
Abiad (2010) 
  Interest rate controls Measures whether the government imposes interest rate controls, either directly or by  
means of interest rate floors, ceilings or interest rate bands. 
Abiad (2010) 
  Entry Barriers Measures whether there are licensing requirements for newly established domestic 
financial institutions, restrictions on certain banking practices and entry barriers for 
foreign banks.  
Abiad (2010) 
  State ownership in the  
  banking sector 
Measures the share of banking assets controlled by state-owned banks. 
 
Abiad (2010) 
  Restrictions on international   
  capital flows 
  
Measures whether there are capital account controls and restrictions, transaction taxes 






   
GDP Total gross domestic product.  GFDD 
INFLATION Yearly inflation rates. Inflation rates above 100% and below -100% are excluded.  GFDD 
TRADE The ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP  GFDD 
POPULATION The total size of the population. GFDD 
DEMOC An index, ranging from 0 to 20, that measures the extent of democracy, where 0 refers 
to a full autocracy and 20 refers to a full democracy.  
Polity IV Database 
POLCON Index that estimates the existence of political constraints. It considers various features 
of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government and measures the 




Additional variables (used in Principal component analysis) 
 




These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen 
and expert survey respondents to measure a country’s government effectiveness, voice 
and accountability, control over corruption and regulatory quality. 
 
World Governance  
Indicators 
Banking regulation and 
supervision 
Measures the independence of the banking supervisory agency, whether risk-based 
capital adequacy ratios based on the Basel standard are adopted and the coverage and 







GOV, REG, VOICE and RULE refer to government efficiency, regulatory quality, voice and accountability and rule of law, 
respectively. These variables are taken from the World Governance Indicators (WGI). SC refers to social capital using 
information from the World Value Surveys (WVS). BANK is a measure of the quality of banking supervision, a variable that is 
retrieved from the dataset created by Abiad et al. (2010). 
 
  
Table A.2: Correlation matrix formal institution variables and social capital   
 
GOV REG VOICE RULE SC BANK 
GOV 1 
    
 
REG 0.93 1 
   
 
VOICE 0.84 0.86 1 
  
 
RULE 0.96 0.91 0.87 1 
 
 
SC 0.62 0.51 0.49 0.62 1  




  Table A.3: Principal component analysis for the institutional variables 
Components Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative proportion 
1 4.83 0.805 0.805 
2 0.84 0.139 0.944 
3 0.20 0.034 0.978 
4 0.72 0.012 0.990 
5 0.04 0.007 0.996 
6 0.02 0.003 1.000 
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Table A.4: List of countries for which data are available in the sample 
Albania Costa Rica Hong Kong Mozambique Spain 
Argentina Cote d’Ivoire Hungary Netherlands Sri Lanka 
Australia Czech Rep India New Zealand Sweden 
Austria Denmark Indonesia Nicaragua Switzerland 
Azerbaijan Dominican Rep Israel Nigeria Tanzania 
Bangladesh Ecuador Italy Norway Thailand 
Belarus Egypt Japan Pakistan Tunisia 
Belgium El Salvador Jordan Paraguay Turkey 
Bolivia Estonia Kenya Peru Uganda 
Brazil Ethiopia Korea Philippines Ukraine 
Great Britain Finland Kyrgyz Rep Poland United States 
Bulgaria France Latvia Portugal Uruguay 
Burkina-Faso Georgia Lithuania Romania Vietnam 
Cameroon Germany Madagascar Russia Zimbabwe 
Canada Ghana Malaysia Senegal  
China Greece Mexico Singapore  
Colombia Guatemala Morocco South Africa  
 






Figure A.1: Principal component analysis – Graphical expression of 
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